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H umanitarian mine action is poised for an-other step forward via the Land Cancella-tion and Release approach. Unlike previous 
mine-action developments that were largely systemic 
(e.g., Landmine Impact Surveys) or technical (for ex-
ample, the HSTAMIDS mine detector1), Land Cancel-
lation and Release is essentially conceptual. It balances 
surveys with risk-management assessments in order to 
speed the rate at which Suspected Hazardous Areas can 
be deemed safe and returned to productive use. In some 
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Land Cancellation and Release in mine action is looked at by many experts as the next 
logical step to the safe and time-effective return of mined areas. This interview examines 
the benefits of the land-release method and addresses its criticisms.  
cases, Land Cancellation and Release may occur with-
out any clearance.
Since the term humanitarian demining was intro-
duced by American and other practitioners (United 
Kingdom, France, etc.) or people in Afghanistan in 
late 1988, its doctrines and practices have matured as 
it spread to other conflict-affected countries. Many of 
its technical approaches can be traced to World War II 
and the extraordinary post-war clearance of mines and 
explosive remnants of war that rendered western Eu-
rope largely impact- free a mere five years later. What 
distinguished humanitarian demining—later expand-
ed to the more holistic humanitarian-mine action—
in the latter half of the 20th century from its World 
War II roots was an approach that sought to calcu-
late precisely the scope and nature of the problem 
in advance, followed by more rigorous clearance and 
quality assurance. This approach, ultimately codi-
fied in the first edition of International Mine Action 
Standards in 2001, assured that mine-affected popu-
lations could occupy their lands again safely and that 
deminers would minimize risk to themselves. 
The problem was that mine clearance that adhered to 
IMAS inevitably increased demining costs and times. 
IMAS’ high standards often introduced tensions be-
tween those donor nations, such as the United States, 
which encouraged IMAS at every step, and mine-af-
fected nations eager to speed economic development 
and resettlement of populations while accepting greater 
human risk. I must confess that when I was 
Program Manager for Vietnam, I insisted 
that IMAS be followed to the letter.
Land Cancellation and Release will 
change mine action again. To learn more, 
I approached my colleague, H. Murphey 
“Murf” McCloy, a humanitarian-demining 
pioneer. Among other accomplishments, McCloy started the first 
United States humanitarian-demining program in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1996 in cooperation with United Nations mine-
action authorities. This program morphed into internationally 
supported programs in several Balkan countries that saved lives 
and contributed to regional confidence-building. Our conversa-
tion about Land Release and Cancellation follows.At the time this photo was taken in Azerbaijan, the hills in the distance were mined. PHOTO COURTESY OF DEBORAH NETLAND, PM/WRA
A Vietnamese Army Engineer Officer, trained to conduct Landmine Impact Surveys, interviews villagers in a hamlet in Quang Binh province, north of the old demilitarized zone, about the locations of ERW. This 
interview took place during the final stages of a multi-million dollar Landmine Impact Survey in Vietnam that was funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. 
PHOTO COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR
1
Stevens: A Conversation about Land Cancellation and Release with H. Murphey “Murf” McCloy
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2009
 | focus | the journal of ERW and mine action | august 2009 | 13.2 | annual issue 13.2 | annual issue | august 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | focus | 
Stevens: What exactly is land release? 
McCloy: The latest draft of IMAS 08.20 (Land 
Release), approved by the IMAS Review Board and that 
should soon be published, defines it as “… the process 
of applying all reasonable effort to identify or better 
define Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA) and remove 
all suspicion of mines/ERW through Non-technical 
Survey, Technical Survey and/or clearance using an 
evidence-based and documented approach.”2
Stevens: What role do surveys play in the land-
release process?
McCloy: Surveys play a central role in the land-re-
lease process, for good and for bad. On the “good side,” 
well-conducted surveys lay the groundwork for efficient 
and cost-effective mine action by narrowing the size of 
the areas that are genuinely hazardous and that need 
to be subjected to expensive, full-clearance measures. 
Doing so has two major benefits. First, scant demining 
resources are expended only on land that contains ex-
plosive threats. Second, some areas may be returned to 
safe use through the application of much less expensive 
survey measures alone—Non-technical Survey being the 
least costly, and Technical Survey being more costly but 
much less expensive than full clearance.
On the other hand, inaccurate or inadequate surveys can 
distort the mine/ERW picture. This can result in an exagger-
ation of the explosive threat in an area, causing unnecessary 
expenditure of clearance resources. Even worse, a “false clear” 
conclusion can divert the application of more definitive sur-
vey/clearance measures from potentially dangerous ground, 
thereby unnecessarily putting land us-
ers at risk. 
Stevens: Given the need by donor 
nations, nongovernmental organi-
zations and individual contributors 
to prioritize their limited funding, 
how do mine-action programs de-
termine the appropriate “end state” 
to be reached?
McCloy: Programs don’t deter-
mine end state; stakeholders do. The 
decision varies with the stakeholders. 
The key stakeholders are the national 
authorities of a mine-/ERW-affected 
nation and the international donors 
that support the mine-action efforts 
of those authorities with funding and 
other assistance. 
For the national authorities, the 
end state may be that point at which 
the explosive threat to the popula-
tion has been reduced to impact-free 
or mine-free status, both of which in-
volve a commitment to a long-term 
effort. The impact-free approach 
that the United States pursues envi-
sions an end state in which “the last 
citizen has been rendered safe from 
the effects of mines.” The mine-free 
end state, favored by advocates of 
the Ottawa Convention ban on anti-
personnel mines, envisions victory 
“when the last mine (anywhere) has 
been cleared/destroyed.” 
For the foreign-government (do-
nor) stakeholder, the end state can 
take a variety of forms, depending on 
the resources that the donor has, and 
the donor’s assessment of the needs 
and chances of success (defined in the 
donor’s terms) in entering into a col-
laborative effort with the host nation 
and other international supporters. 
Each stakeholder must deter-
mine the appropriate end state for 
itself, whether it is pegged to the 
achievement of Ottawa Convention 
commitments, such as eliminating 
all mines within the national terri-
tory, or to shorter-term, pragmat-
ic capacity-building goals (as is the 
case of most U.S. humanitarian 
mine-action assistance programs). 
These goals are oriented toward 
creating a host nation’s indepen-
dent capability to plan, manage and 
execute its national program with 
or without external assistance. 
The only stakeholder that is 
guaranteed to “be there” until the 
“last mine is cleared” end state is 
the mine-affected nation itself. 
Other stakeholders’ end states will 
vary in scope and duration as dic-
tated by their individual political 
and humanitarian goals for the 
host nation concerned and by their 
available resources.
Stevens: Can these end states 
be defined early in the process to 
make it feasible to determine suc-
cessful completion? 
McCloy: Stakeholders/donors 
can and should establish their ini-
tial end state during the mobiliza-
tion phase while they are collecting 
information on the situation in the 
host nation and marshalling assets 
to bring to bear on the problems 
known to exist. Planning an end 
state gives focus and purpose at the 
outset to the coordination and ex-
ecution of the assistance that will 
be provided. This end state repre-
sents a goal to be achieved; objec-
tives and other concrete measures 
of effectiveness can be derived and 
measured using this goal. 
Initial end states are not immu-
table; an initial approach to mine-
action assistance can be revised. 
Conditions can change within the 
political, socioeconomic securi-
ty framework of a post-conflict 
country, as can the end-state goals 
of the individual donors/stake-
holders. The important thing is 
to have an end state in mind from 
the start. Making changes from a 
known point of reference is easier 
and more economical in terms of 
the expenditure of time, resourc-
es and political capital. It also pro-
vides a useful launch point from 
which to elicit and gauge cooper-
ative efforts from host-nation au-
thorities and other stakeholders.
Stevens: What is an acceptable 
level of residual risk?
McCloy: An acceptable level of 
residual risk is what the respective 
national mine-action authorities 
say it is. Residual risk, as defined in 
IMAS 04.10 Glossary of Terms (sec-
ond edition, 1 January 2003), is: “In 
the context of humanitarian dem-
ining, the risk remaining following 
the application of all reasonable ef-
forts to remove and/or destroy all 
mine or ERW hazards from a spec-
ified area to a specified depth.”3 
This verdant grape vineyard in Afghanistan’s Shomali Valley was devastated by fighting and infested with landmines and ERW. Thanks to Roots of Peace, through support 
from U.S.-government grants and private donors, the land was demined and safely replanted, and is again producing delicious grapes for consumption in the region. 
PHOTO COURTESY OF ROOTS OF PEACE
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According to the draft IMAS 08.20 Land Release, in 
the process of determining when land can be released 
from suspicion all reasonable efforts is “the level of ef-
fort required to achieve the desired level of confidence 
that the land is free of mines/ERW.”2 Depending on 
the evidence of explosive contamination gathered from 
the survey techniques applied to a particular piece of 
ground, “all reasonable efforts” can vary from “no fur-
ther efforts are required to release the land” to “more 
surveying is required to make a final determination,” 
all the way to “full clearance measures must be applied 
to this land before it can be returned to safe use.” It is 
the responsibility of the various national mine-action 
authorities to develop a national land-release policy, to 
prepare and publish standards and guidelines govern-
ing the land-release program, and to include a defini-
tion of the criteria for “all reasonable efforts” for their 
respective countries.
Stevens: Can people be confident that landmines/
ERW in a community have deteriorated sufficiently 
to eliminate the risk of explosion?
McCloy: No. Landmine deterioration is a function 
of many variables, including those induced by local soil 
conditions, depth of burial, exposure to sunlight and 
other weather phenomena, type of construction (her-
metically sealed; plastic, metal or wooden casing; firing 
mechanism, etc.), composition of the explosive charge, 
age of the mine, time in the ground, and other factors.
There is no set of conditions that will guarantee that 
all mines, even of the same type, will deteriorate to a 
harmless state. In fact, it is possible for mines under cer-
tain conditions to deteriorate to an unstable state that 
renders them more sensitive/susceptible to unintended 
detonation than when originally manufactured.
Stevens: Can people be confident that all of the 
landmines/ERW have been removed? 
McCloy: No. In spite of the best efforts of human de-
miners, mine-detecting dogs and machines, there is al-
ways the possibility that an area formerly contaminated 
with mines/ERW can contain some residual risk even af-
ter full clearance has been conducted properly. The meth-
ods and procedures prescribed in the clearance-related 
IMAS are designed to ensure the removal or destruction 
of all mine and ERW hazards within a specified area to a 
specified depth. There are no 100-percent guarantees. 
What the members of a mine-/ERW-affected commu-
nity can be confident in is that if a thorough, well-docu-
mented and supervised process has been undertaken (i.e., 
all reasonable effort has been expended), this process will 
reduce the residual risk to a “tolerable level” (i.e., a level 
of threat low enough that they and other stakeholders are 
convinced that the area can be returned to safe use).
This confidence is generated in the local population 
by the demonstrated reliability over time of the nation-
al mine-action authority, mine-action center and local/
international demining organizations to return areas to 
safe use and to respond quickly and effectively in those 
cases where additional threats are found in areas for-
merly considered cleared or free of mine/ERW threats.
Stevens: When does the need to use the land make 
the risk worth taking? 
McCloy: The risk is worth taking when the national 
mine-action authority and other stakeholders, partic-
ularly the local/host-nation stakeholders, feel that it is 
safe enough to use. 
There is a movement by Ottawa Convention adher-
ents and by some international funders of humanitari-
an mine action to expand the use of the full spectrum 
of land-release methodologies to achieve a more expedi-
ent and cost-effective release of areas once deemed to be 
mined. In a world of limited resources, lower-cost mea-
sures such as Non-technical and Technical Survey are 
desirable alternatives to the full-clearance option. Mine-
affected Ottawa States Parties are encouraged to adopt 
land-release policies that include all three methods. 
Ultimately, however, the disposition of mines/ERW 
within the national territory of a mine-affected state 
is the responsibility of the nation itself. Consequent-
ly, this is a decision for national authorities, with the 
national mine-action authority responsible for devel-
oping a national land-release policy and relevant stan-
dards and procedures, hopefully in concert with other 
stakeholders, to include international donors and the 
local civilian community.
The international community can encourage mine-
affected countries to adopt a comprehensive land-release 
program, but it is up to the individual mine-affected 
countries themselves to decide whether to do so, and 
where and how such operations will be carried out.
Stevens: Isn’t Land Cancellation and Release a 
sham that enables donor nations and mine-affected 
nations alike to put a stamp of approval on sloppily 
done work, or proceed on assumptions that are based 
on questionable surveys that could endanger lives in 
order to save money?
McCloy: Land Cancellation and Release is neither a 
sham nor an internationally-orchestrated cost-cutting 
measure that sacrifices the safety and well-being of civil-
ian populations. It is instead a highly developed form of 
risk management that serves to offset the problems associ-
ated with shrinking donor funding for mine action world-
wide. It does this by achieving operational economies of 
scale through database purification, along with the release 
of land through the application of survey and clearance 
methodologies appropriate to the threats confirmed 
through adequate and accurate survey techniques. 
There is no relaxing of standards regarding the lev-
el of evidence required to tailor survey or clearance 
work to the specific tasks, nor is there any lessening or 
“watering down” of the standards to which survey and 
clearance operations must be performed. The aim is to 
employ full clearance (the most costly) resources only 
on genuinely hazardous areas identified through accu-
rate and adequate survey techniques. 
The standards/guidelines set forth in the newly ad-
opted land-recovery-associated IMAS (IMAS 08.20 
Land Release;2 IMAS 08.21 Non-technical Survey;4 and 
IMAS 08.22 Technical Survey5), in conjunction with 
the long-standing IMAS 09.10 Clearance Requirements6 
(published in 2003) set forth procedures and methodol-
ogies that, if properly codified, published and enforced 
by the respective national mine-action authority, will 
return land to safe use at a lower cost with a tolerable 
level of risk that is acceptable to all stakeholders, in-
cluding the local civilian community. 
Land Cancellation includes such activities as purg-
ing the national mine/ERW database of invalid (redun-
dant/incorrect) Suspected Hazardous Area entries as 
well as releasing land for safe use through a combina-
tion of Non-technical Survey, Technical Survey, and/or 
full-clearance operations.
Stevens: The Ottawa Convention ban on anti-
personnel landmines calls for the total elimination 
of landmines. Does Land Cancellation and Release 
undercut the goal of that ban?
McCloy: The Ottawa Convention process has 
evolved into a position that reconciles the “total elim-
ination” position previously accepted by all States 
Parties with the cost-effective “all reasonable efforts/
tolerable risk” approach of the Land Cancellation and 
Release process.
Annex C of IMAS 08.20 Land Release reads: 
“Article 5.2 of the Mine Ban Convention [commonly 
known as the Ottawa Convention] requires each 
State Party to … make every effort to identify all 
areas under its jurisdiction or control in which 
anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be 
emplaced and [to] ensure as soon as possible that 
all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and 
protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the 
effective exclusion of civilians, until all AP mines 
contained therein have been destroyed.”2 
The sophistry involved in moving from the bottom-
line position of destroying all anti-personnel mines to 
accepting the Land Cancellation and Release process is 
that the statement above implies an obligation on the 
part of States Parties to the Convention to ensure that 
mined areas under their control are accurately surveyed, 
and then perimeter-marked by fencing or other means. 
The final connection between “destroying all mines” 
and using “all available methods” (i.e., Non-technical 
Survey, Technical Survey and clearance) to release land 
in a more cost-effective manner is provided by a paper 
titled “Applying All Available Methods to Achieve the 
Full, Efficient, and Expedient Implementation of Arti-
cle 5,”7 endorsed at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties 
in November 2008. 
Two of the key conclusions of this paper are that, 
first, the States Parties acknowledge that land reassess-
ment and release through non-technical means, when 
undertaken in accordance with high-quality national 
policies and standards that incorporate key principles 
highlighted in this paper, is not a shortcut to imple-
menting Article 5.1 but rather a means to more expedi-
ently release with confidence areas at one time deemed 
to be mined.
Second, three main activities can be undertaken to 
assess and, where applicable, to release land that has 
been previously identified and reported as part of a 
“mined area”: Non-technical means, Technical Survey 
and clearance.
Note that it is the responsibility of the national au-
thorities of the mine-affected countries to make this 
work. This responsibility is also reflected in the duties 
of the national mine-action authority as set forth in the 
land-release-related IMAS.
Annex C of IMAS 08.20 states that while proponents 
of the Ottawa Convention have tried to make a simi-
lar connection between survey and the elimination of 
mines/ERW for the Convention on Certain Conven-
tional Weapons (to which the United States is a State 
Party), the implied connection between “all reasonable 
precautions” and “survey” is not nearly as compelling.
Stevens: At the humanitarian mine-action 
workshop hosted by China in April 2004, several 
Western demining organizations intimated that 
Chinese demining procedures at the time were not 
up to IMAS standards, imperiled both deminers 
and the affected populations, and were harmful 
to the environment. The Chinese defended their 
approach as “practical, reliable, simple, and low-
cost—and particularly suited for mine-clearance in 
developing countries.” This approach was rejected by 
the Western participants, in part because it implied 
that the lives of people in developing countries were 
not as worthy as those in richer countries. Doesn’t 
the new Land Cancellation and Release IMAS 
essentially echo the Chinese approach?
McCloy: While the Chinese demining procedures 
were definitely low-cost, they were not in accordance 
with the IMAS. In the case of the Land Cancella-
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tion and Release process being es-
poused through the new IMAS, 
there are definite standards that 
cover this process and acknowl-
edge the potential residual risk to 
affected populations while present-
ing procedures/methodologies to 
keep the risk at a level acceptable 
for all stakeholders (tolerable risk), 
including the civilian population. 
The Chinese level of risk was 
risk defined by default, or lack of 
adherence to appropriate interna-
tional standards. The new IMAS 
land-release level of risk is a func-
tion of conscious design with the 
savings in time and money care-
fully weighed against safety, and it 
is contingent on the thoroughness 
of the various survey and clear-
ance processes.
Stevens: Which would you 
rather visit: a known mined area 
that had been cleared to tra-
ditional IMAS standards, or a 
once-suspected mined area that 
had simply been released fol-
lowing a data-collection exercise 
with accuracy and thoroughness 
certified by the host government 
but unknown to you?
McCloy: All things being equal, 
naturally I would feel confident that 
the residual-risk potential would 
be lower for an area subjected to 
full clearance than for that released 
through survey alone. However, if I 
trusted in the abilities of each link 
in the mine-action chain, I would 
not hesitate to visit either area you 
described, although I would prob-
ably be more “situationally aware” 
in the survey-released area.
If I were a local that needed the 
land to feed my family, I would 
probably feel the same way. Above 
all, I think that the risk manage-
ment inherent in the land-release 
process is far superior in terms of 
lower risk/higher safety than do-
it-yourself village demining (or 
informal demining as it is now 
called), which is what many inhab-
itants of threat areas must resort to 
because of the needs-resources pri-
orities gap that delays mine action 
for years. 
The more I know about mine ac-
tion—to include the role and effec-
tiveness of the national mine-action 
authority and the operational repu-
tations of the mine-action center 
and the demining organizations 
performing the survey/clearance 
work—the more confident I am 
about where I can safely venture.
See Endnotes, page 62 
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The three scenarios below help to explain some of the 
dilemmas mine-action authorities face when implementing 
Land Cancellation and Release policies.  
Sri Lanka. The above photo depicts a freshly cultivated field 
on the Jaffna Peninsula, directly adjacent to some red minefield 
demarcation stakes. The area was cleared in one day. When the 
deminers arrived the next day, a farmer had already plowed to 
the red stakes. In this case, one could say that the farmer con-
ducted de facto quality assurance/quality control. What is the 
Sri Lankan national mine-action authority to do? 
Angola. Here is a hypothetical scenario drawn from real 
situations: A key dirt road connects two towns in Angola. It 
was reportedly mined and the adjoining areas may well be 
mined. Yet, for the past year residents have used this road 
with trucks, xs and animal-drawn carts without suffering 
any injuries or deaths from mines. Should the Angolan national 
mine-action authority declare victory in this area and focus its 
demining resources exclusively on other hazardous areas?
Cambodia. Here is another hypothetical situation inspired 
by actual scenarios: One or more polygons on a Landmine 
Impact Survey of a district in Cambodia indicate that the areas 
in question are mined. Yet, for the last three years farmers 
in this allegedly mined area have been intensively cultivating 
their rice paddies and have not suffered any injuries or deaths. 
Should the Cambodian national mine-action authority still 
make an effort to survey the land before declaring it safe, or 
should they use their limited resources to clear other land that 
is definitely mined? 
In all three cases, the answers to the real-world situa-
tions described above would have to be provided by the 
countries’ national mine-action authorities. The national 
mine-action authorities could all release areas “empirical-
ly cleared” based on the evidence available. There must 
still be a process undertaken to define the actual limits of 
the areas declared tolerably free from the risk of mines. 
The use of the land without adverse consequences in 
the three examples cited above does provide evidence 
(and here I stress evidence, not proof) that these areas 
contain no explosive threats and may not need to be 
subjected to full clearance in order to be returned to safe 
usage. Nevertheless, these areas still need to be accurately 
defined in terms of grid coordinates and turning points (like 
any other piece of cleared ground), and officially released 
only after being subjected to the land-release processes 
and procedures specified by the national mine-action 
authority of the respective country.  
To further illustrate, a national mine-action authority may 
feel that the fact that a farmer has plowed certain ground 
without encountering a mine may be due more to luck than 
to the actual absence of explosive threats, and, therefore, 
would require more stringent (and costly) final proofs to re-
lease land plowed only once, but would require less cost-
ly measures for land that has been plowed two times or 
more. Similarly, while the roadbeds of well-traveled sections 
of road may be considered for release short of full clear-
ance, the fact is that there is much less compelling evidence 
that there are no explosive threats present on the adjacent 
slopes. Consequently, the roadbeds may be defined and 
released after less costly and time-consuming measures 
while the accompanying verges of these same sections of 
road may require much more work to achieve release. In 
the end, it will all depend on the proofs/procedures speci-
fied by the national mine-action authority. Given the same 
conditions in different countries, the proofs and procedures 
could be different in each situation, depending on how the 
national authorities view “tolerable risk.”
Reconciling Real-world Situations with Formal 
Land Cancellation and Release
PHOTO COURTESY OF THE HALO TRUST
The Chinese level of risk was risk defined by default, or lack of 
adherence to appropriate international standards. 
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